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ADDRESSING WEALTH DISPARITIES: REIMAGINING
WEALTH TAXATION AS A TOOL FOR BUILDING WEALTH
GOLDBURN P. MAYNARD JR.t
ABSTRACT
In the past three decades, research has indicated that the building of
personal assets can have a sustainable impact on well-being. Yet to the
extent that the tax system has incorporated this insight, it has been done
in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, disproportionately benefiting those with
wealth and further reinforcing wealth inequality. This Article argues that
while reducing wealth concentrations is important, there should be an
increased emphasis on how our tax system can build wealth or, put dif-
ferently, level up. While the problem of wealth disparities may be too
large for any one part of the federal policy toolkit to solve, I argue that
the tax system can and should play a vital role.
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INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession and the Occupy Movement thrust issues of
wealth and income inequality to the forefront of the national conscious-
ness. Many fear that the continuing concentration of wealth at the top
and the resulting gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots" will un-
dermine American democratic principles by creating a plutocratic class
that captures the government. Through this lens, wealth inequality
threatens fundamental American values, including equality and oppor-
tunity for mobility. In several ways this concern is similar to that of Pro-
gressives at the turn of the twentieth century. Then, the rise of the manu-
facturing sector and a large number of mergers sparked fears that the
government had been captured by corporations and a few wealthy fami-
lies.1
To combat this feared consolidation, Progressive reformers argued
that the nation's tax burdens should be redistributed, and they succeeded.
The system of regressive duties and taxes gave way to a progressive in-
come tax and an estate tax.2 Both largely applied to the wealthiest mem-
bers of society, and to the extent that they redistributed wealth, were
aimed at reducing wealth concentrations or, in other words, leveling
down. The estate tax has continued to focus on leveling down wealth,
despite indications that it has done so poorly, while the income tax sys-
tem is often critiqued for leveling down too much.
This Article argues that while reducing wealth concentrations is im-
portant, law can and should also build wealth or, in other words, level
1. See, e.g., Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting, 27 SOI BULL. 118, 120 (2007).
2. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era




up. While the problem of wealth disparities may be too large for any one
part of the federal policy toolkit to solve, I argue that the tax system can
and should play a vital role. In the past three decades, research has indi-
cated that individual asset accumulation can have a sustainable impact on
well-being.4 Yet to the extent that the tax system has incorporated this
insight, it has been done in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, disproportionate-
ly benefiting those with wealth and further reinforcing wealth inequali-
ty.5  Now is the time to develop a systemic approach aimed at reducing
wealth disparities.
The current debate about taxing wealth has largely focused on the
estate tax, the primary policy directed at redistributing wealth. At the
heart of the political disagreement lies a long-disputed philosophical
question: is wealth a natural right or a social privilege?6 Estate tax aboli-
tionists have argued that the government has no right to "double tax" its
citizens, while Progressives have argued that the government can legit-
imately tax inheritance to ensure equality of opportunity for its citizens.
Almost a century after the enactment of the modern estate tax, this disa-
greement is no closer to being resolved. Unfortunately, this now en-
trenched division about the federal estate tax, along with the absence of a
comprehensive wealth taxation policy, has obscured the wealth accumu-
lation realities of the U.S. tax system as a whole. Yet while the estate tax
3. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV.
469, 470-72 (2007) ("[R]esource equality requires not only 'leveling down' through inheritance
taxation to reduce private inheritance but also 'leveling up' through a public inheritance that helps
give every individual the financial means to start adult life from a position of equality. Conventional
discussions of inheritance taxation, by contrast, typically consider only leveling down.").
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICA WELFARE
POLICY 148 & fig.8.1 (1991) (arguing that assets "[i]mprove household stability," "[c]reate an orien-
tation toward the future," "[s]timulate development of other assets," increase civic participation, and
enhance the well-being of children); Caroline O.N. Moser, The Asset Vulnerability Framework:
Reassessing Urban Poverty Reduction Strategies, 26 WORLD DEV. 1, 5 (1998).
5. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 133-35, 193-98 (2004).
6. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-13 ("Wills, therefore, and
testaments, rights of inheritance and successions, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal
laws, and, accordingly, are in all respects regulated by them."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3-4
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) ("'[T]hat the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;' that the dead
have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be his when
himself ceases to be, and reverts to society." (emphasis omitted)). But see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 1, ch. 9, § 88, at 207 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1698) ("Men are not Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves, their Children
have a Title to part of it, and have their Kind of Right joyn'd with their Parents, in the Possession
which comes to be wholly theirs, when death having put an end to their Parents use of it, hath taken
them from their Possessions, and this we call Inheritance.").
7. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1215, 1217-27 (1984); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE L.J. 283, 300-02 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259,
274-78 (1983); John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1, 77-
81 (2002).
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has reduced wealth concentrations only minimally,9 the income tax has
provided robust subsidies for those with wealth to accumulate further
assets.10
In order for the tax system to more effectively address wealth dis-
parities that threaten equal opportunity, the needs of the poor and non-
wealthy must be more fully incorporated into all of its policies, including
the income tax system. Scholars have made important contributions by
(1) defending income support for the poor through the tax system," (2)
suggesting improvements to our savings subsidies for low income tax-
payers,'2 and (3) criticizing subsidies for homeownership that dispropor-
tionately benefit those with higher incomes.13 No scholarship, however,
connects these goals with attempts to reduce wealth concentration while
offering a comprehensive view of the effects of our tax policy on wealth
accumulation and preservation.
This Article fills that void, arguing the current conception of wealth
taxation must change to meet the demands of the twenty-first century,
much like reformers reimagined our system of taxation at the beginning
of the twentieth century. To date our system of wealth taxations has fo-
cused on (1) reducing concentrations of wealth, (2) encouraging wealth
building by the upper income classes, and (3) treating the estate and in-
come tax regimes as disconnected. What is needed instead are income
and estate tax policies that are sensitive to the vital role of wealth build-
ing in changing long-term outcomes for the poor and nonwealthy.
To this end, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly defines
wealth for the purposes of this analysis, underscoring its importance be-
cause of its long-lasting nature. Part I then presents asset-building re-
search and examines the importance of assets for wealth accumulation. I
show that a lack of assets translates into vulnerability during times of
9. Compare Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining
Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2013) (arguing that the estate tax has become
largely irrelevant), with Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate
Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2013) (arguing
that the "estate tax is a particularly apt reform vehicle" for combating inequality).
10. Michael Sherraden, Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor, in ASSETS FOR THE
POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 302, 304 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N.
Wolff eds., 2001).
I1. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790 (2007) (arguing that earned income tax credit is vulnerable because of its perception as welfare
for blacks); Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the
Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 461, 466 (analyzing the shift in earned income
tax credit benefits away from the working poor).
12. See, e.g., EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 159-160 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 329,
343-45 (2009) (arguing that low-income homeowners are least likely to take advantage of the mort-
gage interest deduction); Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 187 (2013) (arguing that the subsidies for home sales rest on questionable policy justifications
and should be repealed).
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economic crisis like the Great Recession. It also means less money in the
bank for an education and less funds on which to retire. As such, Part I
argues that asset building should play a central role in addressing wealth
inequality.
Part II proceeds to describe the estate tax, emphasizing its purported
goal of leveling down wealth. High exemptions and proliferating loop-
holes have resulted in a levy that taxes less than one percent of estates,
reducing wealth concentration only at the margins. This is in stark con-
trast to the income tax, which incorporates robust asset-building, but only
for the upper classes, thus undermining the goal of leveling down wealth.
Part II therefore illustrates how the estate tax and income tax combine to
reinforce wealth disparities.
Part III proposes two policies that can expand our system of wealth
taxation to benefit the poor and nonwealthy. The first is a refundable
income tax credit for asset-building accounts that would incentivize asset
building by the nonwealthy. This would provide a structural opportunity
for those with lower incomes to build wealth. The second is a more tar-
geted estate tax charitable deduction that would reward bequests to
wealth-building activities. This would change the current unlimited de-
duction and incorporate asset-building policies into the estate tax. Part III
then concludes by arguing that these policies would move the current
system in the direction of increased egalitarianism.
I. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND CURRENT RESEARCH
This Part defines wealth as an asset-based concept and sketches the
now familiar problem of wealth inequality. To underscore the central
role of government policies in wealth accumulation, I also present asset-
building research and provide examples of asset-building policies that
date back to the nineteenth century.
A. Understanding Wealth and Wealth Inequality
Because of its everyday connotations, wealth can be a difficult con-
cept to discuss and understand. It is usually thought to be an "abundance
of valuable material possessions or resources."l4 We think of someone
who is wealthy as being someone who is quite rich. This became a topic
for national conversation when President Barack Obama defined the
wealth line at $250,000, a decision which was questioned by some upper
middle class taxpayers.'5 Scholars have also differed on how to define
wealth.'6 In this Article I am interested in a more general definition of
14. Wealth Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/wealth (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
15. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rich and Sort of Rich, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at
WKI.
16. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (defining wealth as "the value in dollars or dollar equivalents ... of
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wealth-anything of value. For this purpose, wealth is defined as an in-
dividual's economic assets or net worth. Thus, wealth is measured as an
individual's assets minus his or her debts.17 Assets can be bank accounts,
houses, stock, 401(k)s, etc. Debts include mortgages, vehicle loans, cred-
it card balances, etc.'8 Of course, there are noneconomic components to
wealth that may be even more important than assets.19 For example, so-
cial networks can be vital to both status attainment and asset accumula-
tion.20 However, because of factors such as the sanctity of private owner-
ship and respect for family privacy, it is more difficult to address these
noneconomic factors through government policy.2 1
The asset-based efinition of wealth is important because tradition-
ally the story of economic inequality in the United States has dispropor-
22tionately focused on income. Income refers to the flow of dollars over a
everything in society"), with D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (1986)
(criticizing Posner's definition of wealth for only accounting for values at a given point of time
instead of considering flows of value through time).
17. A more sophisticated way of saying this is the net value of all goods available for an
individual's exclusive use through time discounted to the present at the appropriate interest rate.
18. See MEIZHU LuI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL
WEALTH DIVIDE 1-2 (2006) (examining racial wealth disparities between white and non-white in
the United States); SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., LESS THAN EQUAL: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION 1, 6 n.l (2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412802-Less-Than-Equal-Racial-Disparities-in-Wealth-
Accumulation.pdf (arguing that income inequality understates the size between whites and non-
whites in the United States).
19. These noneconomic components of wealth include social networks, love, integrity, and
family morale, which make it difficult to reach unless society is prepared to compromise its com-
mitment to privacy of the family and private ownership.
20. See, e.g., Nan Lin, Social Networks and Status Attainment, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 467, 470-
72 (1999) (tracing the development of social resources theory, which argues that social capital en-
hances chances of attaining better statuses and is contingent on initial positions in the social hierar-
chy).
21. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 504 (1952) ("[T]he gravest source of inequality of opportunity in our society
is not economic but rather what is called cultural inheritance."); see also LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS
NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 158-59 (2002) (noting that this source of
inequality may be more important than inherited wealth and yet it may be impossible to eliminate).
22. Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. REV.
Soc. 63, 64 (2000). One important exception to this disproportionate focus on income is the repara-
tions literature. See, e.g., BORIS 1. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 128-37 (1973);
Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
475, 483 (2003); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slav-
ery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 536 (2003); Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over
Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1193 (2004); Lisa A. Crooms, Remembering the
Days of Slavery: Plantations, Contracts, and Reparations, 26 U. HAW. L. REv. 405, 412 (2004);
Adrienne Davis, Reparations and the Slave Trade, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 285, 286 (2007);
Maria Grahn-Farley, The Master Norm: On the Question of Redressing Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1215, 1219-20 (2004); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs ofSlavery, 89
GEO. L.J. 2531, 2550 (2001); Stephen Kershnar, Reparations for Slavery and Justice, 33 U. MEM. L.
REV. 277, 287-88 (2003); Albert Mosley, Affirmative Action as a Form ofReparations, 33 U. MEM.
L. REV. 353, 364-65 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigat-
ing the Issues, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 245, 257-58 (2003); George Schedler, Responsibility for and
Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 307, 338-39 (2003); Watson
Branch, Comment, Reparations for Slavery: A Dream Deferred, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 177, 196
(2002); Lee A. Harris, Note, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Repara-
tions, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409, 424 (2003). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black
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period of time. These are usually derived from salaries, wages, invest-
ments, alimony, government transfers, etc. Income data is easier to ob-
tain from pay stubs, bank records, and tax returns, for example, whereas
wealth is harder to measure, with individuals often underestimating their
holdings.23 As such, income is often used as a proxy for wealth and the
two concepts can be conflated. A useful way to think about the differ-
ence is that income is more sensitive to life's ups and downs. Thus, an
individual may lose her job-her source of income-but still have sub-
stantial investments-her source of wealth-to survive until she finds a
new job. Wealth usually changes over longer periods of time and can
reach across generations. Income is unequally distributed but much less
so than wealth.24 Therefore, observing income alone does not capture the
degree of wealth concentration in the United States.
Despite these difficulties in measuring wealth, there are some clear
data regarding relative wealth disparities in the United States.2 Wealth
disparities and inequalities in the United States are by no means a new
phenomenon. However, the inequality has worsened in recent decades.
For the past century, wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a
small minority. By the 1920s, the top 1% of wealth holders owned an
average of 30% of the nation's wealth.26 This number decreased during
the Great Depression and in the post-World War II period, but began to
27rise again in the 1970s. On the other hand, over 10% of the population
has no wealth at all.28
The intergenerational reach of wealth is important because it un-
dermines equality of opportunity. Despite its widespread embrace, equal
opportunity remains a thorny concept. While it may be impossible to
achieve true equality of opportunity, it endures as a goal of our society. It
is flexible and slippery enough to be embraced by conservatives and lib-
erals alike. Resource egalitarians argue that equality of opportunity
would require that each individual have equal wealth at the beginning of
life and that opportunities to accumulate further wealth be equal
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Repara-
tions for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 692 (2003). For a re-
sponse directly towards Posner and Vermeule, see Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery
Right-A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 255-56 (2004).
23. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 58-59 (2006) ("Surveys of assets and wealth invariably
underrepresent the upper levels, primarily because of the difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of
enough very wealthy subjects. Thus random field surveys conservatively understate the magnitude
of wealth inequality." (footnote omitted)).
24. See, e.g., Marco Cagetti & Mariachristina De Nardi, Wealth Inequality: Data and Models,
12 MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 285, 286 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Detailed Tables on Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/data/dtables.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
26. Keister & Moller, supra note 22, at 63.
27. Cagetti & De Nardi, supra note 24, at 292.
28. Id. at 288.
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throughout life.29 According to political philosophers Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel, "The most clearly unacceptable sources of inequality in a
social order are deliberately imposed caste systems or other explicit bar-
riers, by which members of certain racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
categories are excluded from desirable positions in political, social, or
economic life.',30 This view would place prime importance on ridding the
nation of explicit, de jure, barriers such as Jim Crow laws.
Wealth disparities pose a more nuanced problem. Their legacy part-
ly continues because of the intergenerational nature of wealth. Disparities
would probably fall into the second category of unacceptable equality
that Murphy and Nagel identify.3 1 This consists of "hereditary class strat-
ification, under which people are born with very unequal life prospects
and opportunities simply by virtue of the success or luck of their parents
and grandparents, and the society does nothing to repair this."32 Because
of the importance of wealth, the average poor person in America is still
living under a system wherein she faces unequal life prospects solely as a
result of her ancestry.
B. Addressing Wealth Inequality through Asset Building and Develop-
ment
The focus on income inequality has also had an impact on our
equality enhancing policies. The nation's social development policies
have focused almost exclusively on income support. Social safety net
policies such as welfare and the earned income tax credit (EITC) are
vitally important in helping individuals provide for basic necessities and
alleviate suffering. However, they provide an incomplete solution be-
cause evidence suggests that income support policies do not have lasting
effects and do not solve the long-term problem of poverty.33 Ultimately,
income does not have the intergenerational reach that wealth does, and
income does not insure against difficult times like wealth does.
The focus on income support policies has begun to shift in the past
three decades. The interest in asset development as a strategy to promote
social and economic development has grown because, as compared to
income, assets may have a more sustainable impact on well-being.34
Well-being has become a central consideration for policymakers. For
29. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 21, at 120.
30. Id. at 56-57.
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 57.
33. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1651-52 (2005) (arguing
that developing countries need to look beyond their systems of income taxation to reduce wealth
inequality).
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., John F. Helliwell, Well-Being, Social Capital and Public Policy: What's New?,
116 ECON. J. C34, C34 (2006) (summarizing empirical research on life satisfaction and well-being,
areas which have been under-analyzed in classical economics).
152 [Vol. 92:1
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example, the insight of psychologists as to how human beings value
goods, services, and social conditions are now taken into account by
standard economics.36
The policy shift toward asset building has been supported by both
theoretical and empirical foundations. The theoretical models have sug-
gested that asset ownership may lead to better economic, psychological,
social, civic, political, and intergenerational outcomes.37 Empirical re-
search has provided some evidence to support the theoretical models.3 8
Specifically, empirical research has found connections between asset
ownership and positive outcomes including: increased wealth,39 political
participation,40 educational attainment,41 and health.42 However, more
work still remains to be done on the long-term efficacy of these poli-
-43cies.
Despite the potential benefits of asset holding, many families have
little savings, especially families headed by members of racial and ethnic
minorities.44 Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the wealth gap is
36. See, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY ET AL., HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 13-14, 154-
62 (2008) (tracing major developments of happiness research in economics and describing how the
government can provide the conditions for people to achieve well-being).
37. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 310.
38. Asset building also has positive effects for women. Control and ownership of assets
increases their bargaining power in the household. See, e.g., Bina Agarwal, "Bargaining" and Gen-
der Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, 3 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 8 (1997); Kathleen Beegle,
Elizabeth Frankenberg & Duncan Thomas, Bargaining Power Within Couples and Use of Prenatal
and Delivery Care in Indonesia, 32 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 130, 134 (2001). It also provides better
prospects for female education, see Forum for African Women Educationists, What Can We Do To
Fight Poverty and Therefore Curb Dropout Among Girls?, FAWE NEWS, July-Sept. 2000, at 13,
available at http://www.fawe.org/Files/fawenews_8-3.pdf, and increases female autonomy and
empowerment, see, e.g., Pradeep Panda & Bina Agarwal, Marital Violence, Human Development
and Women's Property Status in India, 33 WORLD DEV. 823, 842 (2005).
Child well-being in general is improved among children whose parents own assets. See,
e.g., Joanna Armstrong Schellenberg et al., Inequities Among the Very Poor: Health Care for Chil-
dren in Rural Southern Tanzania, 361 LANCET 561, 566 (2003). When mothers own assets, children
have better outcomes because their nutrition is better and they benefit from increased spending on
education and clothing. See, e.g., Agnes R. Quisumbing & John A. Maluccio, IntrahouseholdAllo-
cation and Gender Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries 24-29
(Food Consumption and Nutrition Div., Int'l Food Policy Research Inst., Discussion Paper No. 84,
2000).
39. See, e.g., Mark Schreiner et al., Assets and the Poor: Evidence from Individual Develop-
ment Accounts, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
185, 198 (Michael Sherraden ed., 2005).
40. See, e.g., SHERRADEN,supra note 4, at 165-66.
41. Id at 151-52.
42. See, e.g., Deon Filmer, Fever and its Treatment Among the More and Less Poor in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 20 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 337, 344 (2005).
43. Researchers till do not agree on the effectiveness of these programs. For example, a study
of a matched savings program for low and moderate-income adults showed that it moderately in-
creased homeownership rates among renters, but did not have an effect on other types of assets or
net worth. Gregory Mills et al., Effects of Individual Development Accounts on Asset Purchases and
Saving Behavior: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1509, 1519-24 (2008).
44. The median value of financial assets held by nonwhites is $9,000. Brian K. Bucks et al.,
Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A19 (2009). The issue of the racial wealth gap is a complicated one
and is beyond the scope of this Article.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the difference in consumption and saving patterns.4 5 That is, the average
lower income family has a poor future orientation.46 As such, they rely
on instant gratification and save less. One study by two economists ex-
amined savings by race and found no evidence that blacks have a lower
savings rate than whites.47 But a more recent study found that the racial
wealth gap would have narrowed if blacks devoted as high a share of
their income to savings as whites.48 However, much of this difference
stemmed from the fact that saving rates rise with incomes and blacks
have lower incomes than whites.49 The savings rate difference was not
significant when the authors controlled for income.50
Instead, this low level of saving suggests inadequate institutional
support for asset accumulation. While individual characteristics and be-
havior are closely tied to asset accumulation, several studies have found
that institutional constructs such as access and information also play an
important role.51 That is, once the poor and nonwealthy have institutional
support, such as financial literacy classes and matching funds, they save.
1. Historical Asset-Building Policies
Asset-building policies have been utilized throughout the nation's
history. The Homestead Acts gave nearly 1.5 million American families
title to 287 million acres of land, which is more than half the size of the
state of Alaska.52 The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created
during the Depression,53 also encouraged asset development.54 It incen
tivized homeownership by improving housing standards, providing an
adequate home financing system, and stabilizing the mortgage market.
Finally, the G.I. Bill provided a range of benefits to World War II veter-
ans including low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans to start a business,
cash payments of tuition and living expenses to attend college, high
45. Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst & Nikolai Roussanov, Conspicuous Consumption and
Race, 124 Q.J. ECON. 425, 436 (2009) (showing that Blacks and Hispanics devote a larger shares of
expenditures to visible goods).
46. See Marcia Shobe & Deborah Page-Adams, Assets, Future Orientation, and Well-Being:
Exploring and Extending Sherraden 's Framework, 28 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 109, 119 (2001).
47. Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Diferences in Wealth and Asset Com-
position, 105 Q.J. ECON. 321, 332, 338 (1990). Blau and Graham found that "[e]ven after controlling
for racial differences in income and other demographic factors, as much as three quarters of the
wealth gap remains unexplained." Id. at 321.
48. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth Accumu-
lation, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 193, 195 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 195-96.
51. See Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of Saving: Impli-
cations for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. Socio-ECON. 457, 466 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Trina Williams Shanks, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in
American History, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
20, 29, 31 (Michael Sherraden ed., 2005).
53. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246.
54. See, e.g., James Midgley, Asset-Based Policy in Historical and International Perspective,
in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 42, 49-50 (Mi-
chael Sherraden ed., 2005).
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school or vocational education, and one year of unemployment insur-
55ance.
Because of the intergenerational nature of wealth, the effect of these
policies continues to be felt to this day. For example, one study estimates
that about 46 million American adults are homestead descendants.5 ' This
means that up to one-quarter of U.S. adults (based on 2005 estimates)
can trace their legacy of property ownership, class status, and economic
mobility to this federal government policy.57
2. Lump-sum Transfers
In the late 1990s, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott presented an
ambitious asset-building proposal that would move our society closer to
providing genuine equality of opportunity.58 The concept was built on the
idea that an individual should have a stake or feel invested in all aspects
of society.5 9 As previously noted, research to this point has shown that
building assets does more than just add money to bank accounts.6 0
Ackerman and Alstott proposed that, upon either entering college or
turning 21, every American would receive $20,000 a year for four years,
to use as they would like.61 The $80,000 was thought by the authors to
give a genuine head start to every young person, regardless of his or her
62parents' wealth or parenting abilities. Those who did not graduate from
high school would receive a smaller amount.63 Acceptance of the money
would be optional, but those who accepted it would become stakeholders
and would be responsible for giving back to the fund in later years.
Alstott and Ackerman's proposal was never adopted at the federal
level. Despite the attractiveness of providing funds for individuals to get
an education and start a small business, the idea of providing lump-sum
deposits upon entering college or turning 21 may not be the best policy
prescription. An economic study of lottery winners found that those who
won more than $15,000 significantly drew down the amount held in re-
tirement accounts, mutual funds, and general savings.65 The lump-sum
55. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284.
56. Shanks, supra note 52, at 32. Blacks were largely excluded from this asset-building poli-
cy. Id. at 35. When the Homestead Act of 1862 was passed the prospect of black ownership was
questionable. After the Civil War, black codes were put into place to prevent blacks from acquiring
property. Id The Freedmen's Bureau invalidated these codes, but they had a substantial impact
nevertheless. Id.
57. Id. at 32.
58. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
59. Id at 44.
60. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
61. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 58, at 4-8.
62. Id. at 23-31.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 78.
65. Guido W. Imbens, Donald B. Rubin & Bruce 1. Sacerdote, Estimating the Effect of Un-
earned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery
Players, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 778, 779, 784, 791-92 (2001) (finding that unearned income reduces
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amounts encouraged increased consumption.66 Instead of lump-sum de-
posits, social development scholars have suggested long-term and sys-
tematic accumulation into accounts beginning at birth.67 These kinds
programs have been studied in several countries for the past two dec-
ades.
3. Individual Development Accounts
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are the first and largest
modem policy initiative in asset building for the poor.6 9 They were
spearheaded by social work scholar Michael Sherraden, who wrote As-
sets and the Poor in 1991, and supported by several national foundations
and policy groups.70 IDAs reward savings by asset-poor families aiming
to buy their first home, finance higher education, or start a small busi-
ness.71 For every dollar a family saves, matching funds from a variety of
private and public sources provide an incentive to save.72 IDAs were
usually managed by a community-based organization with accounts held
at local financial institutions.73 Unlike other subsidized savings accounts
such as IRAs or 401(k) plans, IDAs are targeted to the poor and provide
subsidies through matches rather than tax breaks.74 They also require
participants to attend financial education because it has been shown that
access to information increases savings rates among the nonwealthy.
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD), launched in 1997,
was the first large demonstration and evaluation of IDA programs.7 6 The
ADD experiment ran from 1998 to 2003, with 1,103 low-income partici-
pants randomly assigned to experimental and control groups for three
years.n Experimental group members received access to an IDA as well
as financial education and case management.78 The findings revealed that
labor savings); see also William Darity, Jr. & Dania Frank, The Economics of Reparations, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 326, 328 (2003) ("We find that reparations payments that either mandate or provide
incentives for blacks to spend on goods and services produced by nonblacks will raise the relative
incomes of nonblacks. Without significant productive capacity in place prior to reparations, a lump-
sum payment actually could result in an absolute decline in black income. Thus, the structure of a
reparations program is critical if it is to close the black-white economic gap in the United States.").
66. Imbens et al., supra note 65, at 791.
67. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 319 n.4.
68. For comparative studies of several countries, including Canada, Sweden, and Australia,
see generally ASSET-BASED WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Sue Regan & Will Paxton
eds., 2001).
69. SHERRADEN,supra note 4, at 220.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Id at 225.
74. Id. at 224.
75. See Beverly & Sherraden, supra note 51, at 464.
76. Sherraden, supra note 10, at 312.
77. MARK SCHREINER, MARGARET CLANCY & MICHAEL SHERRADEN, CTR. FOR Soc. DEV.,
FINAL REPORT: SAVING PERFORMANCE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM DEMONSTRATION 58 (2002),
available at http://www.usc.eduldept/chepa/IDApays/publications/ADDReport2002.pdf
78. Id. at iii, 51.
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the program had a positive, statistically significant impact on homeown-
ership rates.79 In addition, evidence suggests positive psychological, cog-
nitive, behavioral, and economic effects.80 Contrary to what was believed
about the ability of the poor to save, the program provided some empiri-
cal evidence that poor families sacrifice to put money aside to create
better lives for themselves.8 '
IDAs have proven to be popular and have garnered bipartisan sup-
port. The Assets for Independence Act was passed in 1998 and provided
federal funding to support IDA programs.82 The Assets for Independence
(AFI) Program is now the largest funding source of IDA programs. There
are currently AFI-sponsored programs in 49 states and the District of
Columbia.83 From 1999 to 2009, the programs provided about $180 mil-
lion in competitive grants, assisting more than 72,000 low-income partic-
ipants, and resulting in more than 29,000 asset purchases.84 Most recent-
ly, the Obama administration has proposed a Saver's Bonus, which
would provide a tax credit to match low-income individuals' savings.85
Although there is federal interest in IDAs, the government's investment
in them is dwarfed by the almost $400 billion spent on asset-building
programs for those with higher incomes.
4. Child Development Accounts
Child Development Accounts (CDAs) or Child Savings Accounts
(CSAs) are savings accounts for children that provide a structured oppor-
79. Mills et al., supra note 43, at 1510; see also Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al., Fostering Low-
Income Homeownership Through Individual Development Accounts: A Longitudinal, Randomized
Experiment, 19 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE 711, 731 (2008).
80. For example, asset building has been shown to "have a positive effect on expectations and
confidence about the future; influence people to make specific plans with regard to work and family;
induce more prudent and protective personal behaviors; and lead to greater social connectedness
with relatives, neighbors, and organizations." ROBERT LERMAN & SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN,
URBAN INST., THE EFFECTS OF HOLDING ASSETS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF
FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE 22 (2008) available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/Effects/index.shtml; see, e.g., MARGARET SHERRARD
SHERRADEN & AMANDA MOORE MCBRIDE WITH SONDRA G. BEVERLY, STRIVING TO SAVE:
CREATING POLICIES FOR FINANCIAL SECURITY OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 209 (2010); Margaret S.
Sherraden et al., Short-Term and Long-Term Savings in Low-Income Households: Evidence from
Individual Development Accounts, 13 J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 76, 93 (2004-2005).
81. See Mills et al., supra note 43.
82. Community Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 404, 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1998).
83. Assets for Independence: A Factsheet for Domestic Violence Service Providers, ASSETS
FOR INDEPENDENCE RESOURCE CENTER,
http://idaresources.acf.hhs.gov/page?pageid=a047000000Bo2R2AAJ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
84. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSETS FOR INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM STATUS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TENTH YEAR, at v, 41 (2010), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/afitenth-reporttocongress_0.pdf.
85. See Reid Cramer, The Saver's Bonus: A Proposal to Support Savings by Working Fami-
lies at Tax Time, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION (Dec. 2010),
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/thesavers-bonus.
86. See infra Part II.B.
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tunity to save and accumulate assets.87 They have been implemented in
several countries including Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom.88 CDAs can be structured in a number of ways. For
example the government could provide an initial deposit to the account
upon birth. Additional yearly deposits could be encouraged. Acquiring
financial literacy throughout the school years could also be a program
component. The government could match contributions for low-income
parents. There usually would be restrictions on the withdrawal of funds.
After graduation from high school, account holders could use the funds
for higher education or training. If funds remain at age 25 or older, they
could be used for small business capitalization or a first time home pur-
chase. If funds remain by retirement age they could be used to cover re-
tirement expenses or be passed on to the next generation.
Interest in CDAs has grown in the United States, but they are not
yet a part of federal social policy. There has been legislative discussion
of several CDA proposals including the America Saving for Personal
Investment, Retirement, and Education (ASPIRE) Act, 40lKids Ac-
counts, and Baby Bonds.89 There is a paucity of research on the long-
term impact of these accounts, but that is changing. In 2007 the govern-
ment of Oklahoma randomly selected families with newborns across the
state for a study.90 Half of the families received $1,000 in a special SEED
OK account in the Oklahoma College Savings Plan.9' SEED OK is a
92study of a universal CDA. Its progressivity stems from its focus on
incentivizing the savings of low- and moderate-income families.93 To
date the findings are promising. They show that the automatic account
opening has a positive impact.9 4 On the other hand, the levels of individ-
ual savings have not been significant.95 This may partly be explained by
the recent economic downturn. The question going forward will be how
SEED OK affects final development outcomes and attitudes.
As will be discussed in Part II of the Article, the federal government
has administered several popular asset-building policies through the in-
87. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 309.
88. See Vernon Loke & Michael Sherraden, Building Assets from Birth: A Global Compari-
son of Child Development Account Policies, 18 INT'L J. SOC. WORK 119, 119 (2009).
89. See Reid Cramer & David Newville, Children 's Savings Accounts: The Case for Creating
a Lifelong Savings Platform at Birth as a Foundation for a "Save-and-Invest" Economy, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION 2 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/CSAPolicyRationaleO.pdf.
90. See Welcome to SEED for Oklahoma Kids!, OKLAHOMA STATE TREASURER,
http://www.ok.gov/treasurer/SEEDOK/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
91. Id
92. Yunju Nam et al., Do Child Development Accounts Promote Account Holding, Saving,
and Asset Accumulation for Children's Future? Evidence from a Statewide Randomized Experiment,
32 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 6,7 (2013).
93. Id.
94. Id at 9.
95. Id. at 26 ("The treatment effect for individual savings is also statistically significant, but
the effect size is small. . . .")
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come tax system. However, instead of utilizing asset building to further
economic development and equality, these policies have disproportion-
ately favored the wealthy.
II.OUR CURRENT SYSTEM OF WEALTH TAXATION: REINFORCING
WEALTH DISPARITIES
This Part focuses on our current wealth taxation policies, which en-
compass both the estate and income taxes. I divide the discussion into
three parts. First, I describe the estate tax, its policy rationale of reducing
wealth concentration, and its porous nature because of an alarming num-
ber of loopholes and exclusions. Second, I describe income tax expendi-
tures, which represent subsidies of almost half a trillion dollars, but
which largely ignore the poor. Finally, I show how together these poli-
cies reinforce wealth disparities.
A. Estate Tax: History, Mechanics, and Loopholes
What is usually referred to as the estate tax is technically three lev-
ies working in conjunction: the Estate Tax, the Gift Tax,97 and the Tax
on Generation-Skipping Transfers (GST).98 In order to understand why
the estate tax, despite its purported goal of reducing concentrations of
wealth, has not significantly diminished wealth disparities requires some
historical perspective and an understanding of how the tax works.
1. A Historical Overview
The federal taxation system in the nineteenth century had mainly
consisted of indirect taxes such as import duties and regressive excise
taxes on alcohol and tobacco.99 As the nation began to establish itself as
a world power these taxes provided inadequate funds to meet the increas-
ing revenue needs of the federal government.00 This regressive taxation,
which burdened the working classes disproportionately, along with the
rise of the holding company, and the "unprecedented number of mergers
in the manufacturing sector," resulted in wealth becoming increasingly
concentrated in the hands of the few.'0
Progressives continued to press for both a progressive income tax
and a tax on inheritances to decrease wealth concentration or level down
wealth.102 This eventually led to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
96. 1.R.C. §§ 2001-2209 (2012).
97. Id. §§ 2501-2524.
98. Id. §§ 2601-2663. Special valuation rules relating to these taxes are included in §§ 2701-
2704. Section 2801 contains rules regarding gifts from expatriates.
99. Mehrotra, supra note 2, at 1803.
100. Id. at 1809.
101. Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 119.
102. See Mehrotra, supra note 2, at 1800 (contending that a particular group of academics help
bring about a radical transformation in the United States public finance system). For a comprehen-
sive account of the forces that brought about the progressive income tax, see generally id.
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and the enactment of the modern estate tax.103 The estate tax was passed
as a part of a comprehensive tax reform package in 1916.'0 The First
World War led to a sharp reduction of tariff revenue at a time when the
government needed funds for its military buildup.05 The tax package
transformed the income tax "into the foremost instrument for federal
taxation," imposed a significant tax on corporate profits, and included an
excess-profits tax.106
Although the estate tax was a revenue raiser, this was not the only
reason for its enactment; the federal government also wished to redistrib-
ute the tax burden and reduce the concentrations of wealth.07 Because
the levy could be avoided by giving away property during life, a gift tax
was eventually added, becoming a permanent fixture of the wealth trans-
fer system in 1932.108 The Progressive impulses influenced tax policy
through the end of World War 11.109 President Franklin Roosevelt viewed
wealth accumulation as a distinctly social phenomenon.1 0 For Roosevelt,
the wealthy owed a debt to the communities from which they drew their
fortunes, and the control of an ever-widening spectrum of industry by a
limited number of wealthy individuals stood in contrast to fundamental
American values of competition and civil society."'
After World War II Progressive ideals held less sway in tax policy
and the estate tax basically remained the same until 1976. That year
Congress unified the estate and gift taxes into a single rate, since the
lower gift tax rate encouraged individuals to give away their wealth dur-
ing life to avoid the higher estate tax rate.1 12 The generation-skipping tax
was also added in 1976 in response to tax planning that allowed a dece-
dent's children to avoid paying taxes upon their death.113 In 1981 Con-
gress lowered the estate tax rate, made the marital deduction more tax-
payer friendly, and raised the exemption from $175,000 to $600,000.114
The 1990s saw the rise of the estate tax abolitionists, who presented
a sustained challenge to the policy of reducing wealth concentration. In
103. Id. at 1856.
104. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1, 39 Stat. 756, 756.
105. History of the Finance Committee, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,
http://www.finance.senate.gov/aboutihistory/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
106. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 62 (2d ed. 1996).
107. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 1-1 to 1-2 (June
14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 579829.
108. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245. The gift tax was first introduced
in 1924, but repealed in 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16;
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125 (repealing the gift tax).
109. BROWNLEE, supra note 106, at 5-6.
110. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision, (June 19, 1935),
transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid= 15088.
Ill. Id.
112. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520.
113. Id. § 2006.
114. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401, 95 Stat. 172, 299.
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1999 and 2000, Congress passed bills to permanently repeal the estate
tax, but President Bill Clinton vetoed them both. 15 In 2001, after efforts
for permanent repeal failed, President George W. Bush signed into law
sweeping changes to the estate tax." 6 These further undermined attempts
to level down wealth. The estate tax rate was lowered to 45% and the
exemption increased between 2001 and 2009 incrementally to $3.5 mil-
lion.117 The estate tax was then repealed in 2010, returning in 2011 with a
$1 million exemption."8
At the end of 2010, President Obama reached a compromise with
Congress that further decreased the reach of the estate tax.119 The law,
which expired after two years, lowered the estate tax rate to 35% and
increased the exemption to $5 million.120 In 2013, the estate tax was
again made permanent, with e tax rate increased to 40%, and the $5
million exemption (indexed for inflation) retained.121 It was estimated
that in 2013 the share of estates paying the estate tax, a number which
had historically been between 1 and 2%, would be 0.14%.122
2. The Mechanics of the Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping
Taxes12 3
As stated in the historical overview above, the estate tax was the
first of the three wealth transfer taxes enacted. The estate tax serves as
the main tax, while the gift tax and generation-skipping taxes were meant
to prevent taxpayers from avoiding it. The mechanics of these taxes help
minimize their impact on wealth concentrations. While the top statutory
estate tax rate is 40%, the average effective rate is less than 17%.124 In
addition, Congress has long exempted a certain amount of property from
115. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, President Vetoes Effort to Repeal Taxes on Estates, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 1, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/01/us/president-vetoes-effort-to-repeal-taxes-
on-estates.html.
116. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§
501-581, 115 Stat. 38.
117. Id.§§511,521.
118. Id §§ 901,521(b).
119. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.
120. Id.
121. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2318
(2013).
122. Table T13-0019: Estate Tax Returns and Liability Under Current Law and Various Re-
form Proposals, 2011-2022, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/TI3-0019.pdf [hereinafter TAX POLICY
CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability].
123. For an accessible introduction see STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (3d ed. 2004).
124. Table T13-0020: Current Law Distribution of Gross Estate and Net Estate Tax by Size of
Gross Estate, 2013, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/TI3-0020.pdf [hereinafter TAX POLICY
CENTER, Gross and Net Estate Tax].
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wealth transfer taxation.125 Only after this amount is exhausted are assets
taxed at the current 40% rate.126 Since 2010, this exemption amount has
been $5 million, indexed for inflation.127 This means that for 2013 an
individual can pass on $5.25 million ($10.5 million for a married couple)
of wealth tax free to the next generation. Bequests to spouses2 8 and to
charities129 are not taxed.
a. The Gift Tax
The easiest way for an individual to avoid the estate tax altogether
would be to transfer all assets before death, the point at which the estate
tax is imposed. The gift tax works to prevent this. Gratuitous transfers'30
are subtracted from the $5.25 million exemption amount, which means
that, theoretically, transfers during life and death are treated the same.
However, there are exceptions. Tuition payments and medical expenses
paid on the behalf of any person are excluded from the gift tax.'3 ' The
only requirement is that the donor must make the payment directly to the
service provider.132 This allows parents, grandparents, and other extend-
ed family members to make substantial gifts free of gift taxation and
represents a substantial intergenerational transfer of wealth.3 3
In order to prevent taxpayers from having to report numerous small
gifts, Congress also excluded an amount from gift taxation each year.134
125. This amount is known as the "unified credit" or the "applicable exclusion amount." See
I.R.C. § 2010 (2012). From 1942-1972 the exemption was fixed at $60,000. Federal Estate and Gift
Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 1916-2014, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-and-exclusions-1916-
2014 [hereinafter Federal Estate and Gifi Tax Rates]. By 1987 the figure increased to $600,000. Id.
Since 1997, the amount increased in a series of steps to $5 million. Id.
126. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
127. Id. § 2010(c)(3). The exemption was increased in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insur-
ance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(c)(2), 124 Stat.
3296, 3301.
128. I.R.C. § 2056. This marital deduction is unlimited and based on the premise that the
spouses are one economic unit, and as such transfers between them should not be taxed. But see
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 305 (1995) (critiquing Congress' rationale for creating qualified termina-
ble interest property trusts as paternalistic and degrading to women).
129. I.R.C. § 2055. For more information on the structure and rationale for the charitable
deduction, see generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax,
60 TAX L. REv. 263 (2007).
130. Section 2501(a) imposes a tax on "transfer[s] of property by gift," but the term is never
defined. Generally courts have held that a gratuitous transfer is subject to gift taxation if the donor
has relinquished all "dominion and control" over the property. See, e.g., Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r,
308 U.S. 39, 49 (1939); see also Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943); Bumet v. Gug-
genheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933).
131. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
132. Id
133. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1988) (arguing that education is the main occasion for wealth transmis-
sion in the United States).
134. H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 29 (1932) ("Such exemption ... is to obviate the necessity of
keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts, and . . . to fix the amount sufficiently
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This is known as the annual exclusion amount.'35 No gift tax applies until
a gift exceeds the annual exclusion.136 For 2013 the annual exclusion
amount is $14,000.'13 The annual exclusion applies separately to each
individual donee.'3 ' Thus, for example, on December 31, 2013, a married
couple (whose exclusion is combined)'39 could give each of their three
children $28,000 without any gift tax applying.140 On January 1, 2014,
the couple could give each child another $28,000. Any additional gifts
given in 2014 would then be subject to gift tax. However, the exemption
amount would likely prevent any gift tax from actually being owed. Gift
taxes are not paid until the $5.25 million exemption amount is exhausted.
Using very conservative estimates, a couple with three children could
pass over $14 million of wealth tax free to the next generation.141
Although theoretically transfers during life and death are treated the
same by our wealth transfer taxes, there are advantages to lifetime gifts.
For tax purposes, gifts are valued on the date of the gift,1 42 and property
in the gross estate is valued on the date of the decedent's death.14 3 By
making a gift during life, the donor can remove any subsequent apprecia-
tion in the property's value. Thus, we can imagine a single mother gifting
property to her child valued at $2 million on the date of the gift, and val-
ued at $10 million at the time of her death in 2013. By gifting the proper-
ty during life she was able to transfer it tax free, with $3.25 million of
her lifetime exemption remaining. Thus, the $8 million in appreciation
escaped wealth transfer taxation. If she had kept the property in her es-
tate, the amount over the exemption amount, $4.75 million, would have
been subject to the estate tax, resulting in a tax bill of $1.9 million.'"
large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasionally gifts of relatively small
amounts.").
135. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
136. Id.
I37. Id.; Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, supra note 125. The annual exclusion amount was
$5,000 from 1932 to 1938, $4,000 from 1938 to 1941, and $3,000 from 1942 to 1981. Id. The Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981 raised the exclusion amount to $10,000 and adjusted it for inflation in
multiples of $1,000. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441 95 Stat. 175.
See infra note 114.
138. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).
139. Each spouse could write a separate check, or one spouse could write a $28,000 check,
with the other's consent. These two situations are treated the same because the gift tax specifically
allows for gift splitting. 1.R.C. § 2513.
140. This example assumes that the couple had not given their children any gifts during the rest
of the year.
141. This example does not take inflation into account. It assumes a $10.5 million exemption,
an annual exclusion of $28,000 for the couple, and gifts over a 40-year period (28,000 X 40 =
1,1200,000). It also assumes that each child attends a four-year college with a $30,000/year tuition,
and three years of graduate school with a $50,000/year tuition. Finally, medical expenses of $50,000
are assumed.
142. I.R.C. § 2512.
143. Id. § 2031. The estate is allowed to choose a date of valuation six months after the death
of the decedent, if it lowers the gross estate and tax. Id. § 2032.
144. There is the additional advantage of lifetime gifts that the calculation of gift taxes is tax
exclusive, whereas estate taxes are tax inclusive. Thus, gift taxes do not take into account the tax
itself, but estate taxes do.
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b. The Estate Tax
In simplified terms, the estate tax is due on the net value of proper-
ty, over the exemption amount, transferred at death. The first step in cal-
culating the estate tax is calculating the gross estate.14 5 This is a broad
term that is meant to include any and all property over which the dece-
dent had substantial control.146 The meaning of the term has been com-
plicated because, since the inception of the tax, estates have claimed that
the decedent did not have an "interest"l47 in certain property and, as such,
it should not be subject to the tax.14 8 The estate tax attempts to reach any
economic benefit transferred at death regardless of how the interest is
treated for state law purposes.
The gross estate includes, among other things: (1) the decedent's
probate estate;14 9 (2) dower and curtesy interests;150 (3) certain gifts made
within three years of the decedent's death;'5 ' (4) gift tax on gifts made
during three years before the decedent's death;152 (5) transfers with re-
tained rights or powers;153 (6) transfers taking effect at death;154 (7) revo-
cable transfers;'55 (8) annuities;156 (9) joint tenancy interests;157 (10)
powers of appointment; 15 and (11) proceeds of life insurance policies.1
59
Several deductions are then taken from the gross estate, including:
(1) expenses, indebtedness, and taxes;'6 0 (2) losses incurred during the
settlement of the estate;161 (3) transfers for public, charitable, and reli-
gious uses;162 (4) bequests to a surviving spouse;'63 and (5) state death
145. See id. § 2031.
146. See id. §§ 2033-2044.
147. Id. § 2033 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent . . . .").
148. See e.g., Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1993) (Includ-
ing the value of a house in the estate of a parent who sold her house to her son but retained a life
estate).
149. Id
150. Id § 2034. The rights of dower and curtesy are a set of rules relating to division of marital
property, providing a surviving spouse with a means of support upon the death of the other spouse.
Dower and curtesy rights arise upon the death of a spouse. Dower is a wife's interest in her hus-
band's property upon his death. It is a portion of a deceased husband's real property, usually one-
third, that a widow is legally entitled to use during her lifetime to support herself and their children.
These have largely been abolished and replaced by the elective or forced share. See Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM, 1, 2-4(2003).
151. I.R.C. § 2035.
152. Id.
153. Id § 2036.
154. Id. § 2037.
155. Id § 2038.
156. Id § 2039.
157. Id. § 2040.
158. Id §2041.
159. Id § 2042.
160. Id § 2053.
161. Id § 2054.
162. Id § 2055.
163. Id § 2056.
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taxes.164 The resulting amount is known as "the taxable estate."66 To this
taxable estate, any taxable gifts' 66 are added and the tax rate is applied.6 7
Finally, various credits are applied,168 the most important of which re-
lates to the $5.25 million exemption amount.169 The resulting amount is
due to government nine months after the date of the decedent's death.170
c. The Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers
For the purposes of this Article I will not describe the mechanics of
the generation-skipping transfer tax, which can be complicated. The GST
tax was meant to limit the use of dynasty trusts.'7  Dynasty trusts allow
families of great wealth to minimize or avoid estate taxes that would be
applied at each generation. Until 1986, a wealthy person could avoid
estate taxes by setting up a succession of life estates.12 Because the es-
tate tax applies only to property transferred at death, and a life estate
ends at death, no tax would apply. For example, 0 could create a trust for
the benefit of his children for their lives, then to the children's children
for their lives, then to the grandchildren's children for their lives, and so
forth limited only by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 173 Gift tax may apply
when 0 first creates the trust, but no estate tax would subsequently ap-
ply. 174
The GST tax intervenes by subjecting these kinds of arrangements
to a tax at each generation.175 Hence, transmission either outright or in
trust directly to a grandchild is subject to the GST tax. However, each
individual has a $5.25 million exemption from GST taxes.177 This, along
with the abolishment or modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities by
most states, still allows for significant wealth to be passed on through the
use of dynasty trusts and thus undermines the policy goal of reducing
wealth concentration.178
164. Id. § 2058.
165. Id. § 2051.
166. More precisely, gifts made after 1976, which are known as "adjusted taxable gifts." Id §
2001(b).
167. Id § 2001.
168. See id. §§ 2010-2016.
169. Id § 2010(c)(3). This is known as the unified credit. Id. § 2010.
170. Id. § 6075(a).
171. See Brian Layman, Comment, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools
in the Estate Planner's Arsenal, 32 AKRON L. REV. 747, 754-55 (1999).
172. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON & WILLIAM J. TURNIER, TAXATION OF
ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 722-24 (22d ed. 2002); JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION 981-83 (4th ed. 2003).
173. See CAMPFIELD, DICKINSON & TURNIER, supra note 172, at 722.
174. See id.
175. I.R.C. § 2601.
176. Id. §§ 2611-2613.
177. Id. § 2631.
178. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV.
215, 232 (2011) (noting that Congress made a mistake by depending on the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties when crafting the GST tax exemption); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdic-
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d. Common Estate Planning Techniques
Ever since the inception of wealth transfer taxation, taxpayers and
their planners have found ways to minimize the tax liability. Taxpayers
have to right to avoid, reduce, or minimize their taxes.'7 9 This serves to
further minimize the potential of the estate tax to level down wealth. To
help explain why the estate tax is so porous, I will describe two common
estate planning techniques. These are by no means the most sophisticated
180planning techniques, which can result in more significant tax savings.
The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (ILIT) uses a combination of
gift and estate tax rules to avoid estate taxes and provide liquidity to the
grantor's estate. Although the details can vary on the margins, the
planning technique is achieved as follows. The trust is funded with a life
insurance policy on the life of the grantor. The beneficiaries are family
members of the grantor. The trust is irrevocable, so it is considered a
completed gift.18 2 The insurance policy is now controlled by a trustee and
the grantor has no control over it, so it is out of his estate.' 83 Because the
insurance policy has not been paid up, the gift of the policy is not sub-
stantial enough to trigger tax implications.
To pay up the policy, the grantor transfers an amount equal to the
annual exclusion (currently $14,000) each year. These amounts are not
eligible for the exclusion unless they are present interests, which the ben-
eficiary could enjoy right away.1" To meet this requirement the donor
gives each beneficiary a discretionary right to withdraw the amount for a
few days.185 The yearly transfers continue for the life of the donor and
can result in life insurance policies valued at several million dollars.
tional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis ofPerpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J.
356, 359, 362-63 (2005) (finding that roughly $100 billion was moved to take advantage of the
abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities). But see Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-
Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZo L. REv. 2511, 2511 (2006) ("[T]he
GST tax exemption put a 'spark' to the dynastic impulse already present.").
179. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)
("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one's taxes.").
180. For example, Mitt Romney's estate planning became an issue after his tax returns showed
that he'd gifted his heirs $100 million tax free. He used an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust
(IDGT). Jesse Drucker, Romney 'I Dig It' Trust Gives Heirs Triple Benefit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27,
2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-27/romney-i-dig-it-trust-gives-
heirs-triple-benefit. See generally, Dwight Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 123, 127-28 (2008) (describing several advanced estate planning techniques and why they may
be inadvisable for family businesses).
181. See William S. Huff, The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 38 ARK. L. REV. 139, 139-41
(1984).
182. See supra note 130 (defining a completed gift).
183. See I.R.C. § 2042.
184. Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
185. This power has come to be known as a Crummey power after the taxpayer who brought
the case that upheld the technique. Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1968).
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When he dies, the value of the policy is not included in his estate because
he did not possess "any of the incidents of ownership." 86
Family limited entities are also commonly used to move wealth
from one generation to another while minimizing estate taxes.'7 This
technique relies on gift and estate tax valuation rules. Although most
families use partnerships, LLCs and Subchapter S corporations can
achieve the same result.'88 The fair market value of an asset for estate
and gift tax purposes is "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts."'89 The family limited partnership (FLP) works because
of two factors: (1) parents often want to keep their business in the family
and as such place restrictions on transfer, and (2) an asset with re-
strictions on transfer is not worth as much as one without.190
The FLP is usually formed by a parent who transfers most of her
property to the partnership in exchange for limited partnership interests.
The general partner is often a corporation owned by the individual and
her children. Note that the FLP need not be an actual business; many
FLPs only contain stocks and cash. When the parent transfers these part-
nership interests they have to be discounted to reflect a lack of marketa-
bility and control.'9 ' Thus, for example, assume that the parent had prop-
erty worth $10 million. If she did nothing with this property she would
be liable for tax on the amount over her lifetime exemption, $4.75 mil-
lion. If she instead used an FLP to transfer the property, that $10 million
could perhaps be discounted 35% because the interest has restrictions on
transfer and it cannot be easily sold on the market. The property value
could then be further reduced by another discount of 15% because the
general partner (the corporation owned by the family) controls all the
decisions. Thus, if the interest were to be sold, the buyer would have no
control of the partnership. After these discounts the $10 million property
would be valued at $5.525 million and taxes would only be due on
$275,000.
It may not seem logical to be able to discount an asset by just
changing its form like this, but this technique has been used for over two
decades.192 At first the IRS contended that the separate interests in the
186. 1.R.C. § 2042(2).
187. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 180, at 191.
188. Subchapter C corporations are avoided because they are taxed at the entity level. I.R.C.
§ 11.
189. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
190. See Drake, supra note 180, at 191, 199-200.
191. See Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited Partnership:
How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand Attack, 71 UMKC L. REV. 887,
893 (2003).
192. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, 111, Family Limited Partnerships: Decant-
ing Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 162-63 (1995).
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FLP should be aggregated for valuation purposes, but it eventually aban-
doned this position.'93 The IRS closely scrutinizes FLPs, but taxpayers
have generally been successful in court.19 4
The ILIT and FLP are just two common examples of the many es-
tate planning techniques that undermine efforts to reduce concentrations
of wealth. While the estate tax only minimally levels down wealth, the
next section will show how the income tax substantially helps the
wealthy build more wealth.
B. Income Tax Subsidies for Asset Building
The use of the federal income tax system to administer asset-
building policies has increased substantially since 1970, but these bene-
fits have not inured to the poor. Several of these tax-based policies, such
as individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and medical savings accounts
are familiar to current employees. Others, like 401(k)s and 403(b)s, are
just as ubiquitous and are named after the tax section that defines them.
Even if some of these are labeled "private," they receive substantial gov-
ernment subsidies and are defined by government enactments.195 The
growth of and reliance on asset accounts as a form of social policy has
been unmatched in recent decades.'9 6 Edward Zelinsky has described this
paradigm shift as "a revolution without a mastermind and without a cata-
clysmic event, but a revolution nonetheless which has, step-by-step,
without fanfare, cumulatively transformed tax and social policy in fun-
damental ways."'97
As has been emphasized since Stanley Surrey's seminal article in
1970,198 the government can provide a benefit in two ways: (1) through
direct expenditures: collecting taxes and then distributing funds; or (2)
tax expenditures: deciding not to collect taxes in the first place.'99 There
may be reasons to prefer one over the other but both are economically
equivalent.2oo Tax expenditures can be seen as hidden social benefits,
though the annual Tax Expenditure Budget, which includes revenue loss-
es attributable to tax expenditures, has made them more visible.2 01 Ac-
cording to one estimate, tax expenditures account for about a quarter of
193. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
194. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that there




197. ZELINSKY, supra note 12, at xiii.
198. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 713-14 (1970).
199. See, e.g., id.
200. Surrey argued that direct expenditures were preferable because they were more equitable
and easier to develop and administer. See id. at 723-24, 728-30.
201. This is required by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2011)).
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all social policy spending.202 Of these, over half were directed to asset
building, including "home ownership, retirement accounts, and invest-
ments."203 These three categories track asset accumulation patterns in the
United States. About 70% of U.S. household wealth in 1998 was held in
homes, pension accounts, and business capital.204
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES TO INDIVIDUALS, FISCAL
YEAR 2013205
Type Amount Spent (billions)
Asset Building
Home ownership: mortgage interest, exclusion of $115.3
capital gains, and so on
Retirement accounts: exclusions of pension contri- $117.2
butions, individual retirement accounts, Keoghs,
and so on
Investments and business property: capital gains $158.7
rates and exclusions, exclusion of interest on gov-
ernment bonds, and so on
Total asset-building expenditures to individuals $391.2
Unfortunately, as social development scholars have noted, the shift
toward asset-building policies has been more regressive than social in-
surance and other means-tested income transfer policies.206 There are two
main reasons for this. First, poorer Americans do not have enough assets
to buy into these programs and as such are excluded. Second, because
taxpayers are progressively taxed at higher rates, those who are wealthier
disproportionately benefit from asset building through tax expendi-
207
tures.20 This "upside down" nature of income tax subsidies offers few
benefits for the poor. As such, the current asset-based policies may fur-
ther exacerbate wealth inequality.
202. Sherraden, supra note 10, at 303 (discussing tax expenditures for 1990 and estimated
expenditures for 2000). This includes "education, employment, social services, health care, income
security, housing and nutrition." Id.
203. Id. at 303-04.
204. See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, From 1983 to 1998, in
ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 34, 44 (Thomas M.
Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001).
205. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017, at 33-35, 39-40 (Comm. Print 2013). The format of
this table is based on Sherraden, supra note 10, at 303.
206. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 192-93.
207. David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Savings
Programs? Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 669, 687-88 (2001).
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Taken together, the evidence supports the conclusion that a majority
of the tax expenditures go to the upper classes. For example, more than
half of $47 billion mortgage interest deductions in 1998 went to those
with incomes over $100,000.208 Homeowners with incomes of over
$50,000 received 91% of all the homeownership tax expenditures.2 09 The
1998 numbers for retirement tax expenditures are similar.2 10 Of all these
benefits 67% went to households earning more than $100,000 and 93%
to those earning more than $50,000.211
C. The Tax System Reinforces Wealth Disparities
Although there have been vigorous debates about the estate tax and
its effect on concentrations of wealth, in actuality the estate tax has had a
relatively small impact on the distribution of resources. The estimated
estate tax revenue for 2013 is less than $15 billion.2 12 By comparison, the
income tax system will provide almost $400 billion in wealth-building
subsidies, which disproportionately benefit the wealthy.213
By focusing on justice, fairness, and equitable distribution of the tax
burden, Progressives have underscored the symbolic value of income and
wealth taxation. It is important that the tax system be perceived as pro-
gressive. Reuven Avi-Yonah put it succinctly when he stated: "To a large
extent, current U.S. dissatisfaction with the income tax stems from the
perception that it is not progressive enough-that is, that the rich can
avoid paying their 'fair share."'2 14 As such, the Alternative Minimum
Tax and reductions of the top rate can be viewed as unsuccessful at-
215
tempts to get the rich to pay their fair share. Ultimately, a successful
tax system depends on buy-in from citizens. A perception of fairness is
linked to compliance.216
The symbolic nature of progressive taxation can obscure its reali-
217
ties. 2 The tax system itself has not substantially leveled down wealth.
Wealth disparities have persisted and are on the rise.2 18 This gap between
the appearance of fairness and the reality of wealth inequality was ana-
lyzed by Roberto Unger and Cornel West:




2 12. TAX POLICY CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability, supra note 122.
213. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 205.
214. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 20 (2006).
215. Id. at 21.
216. Id
217. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 919, 991 (1997) (arguing that the debate over progressivity has ignored the possibility that the
poor have positive rights and responsibilities they owe to society).
218. See Graetz, supra note 8, at 271.
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[I]t matters less how fair the raising of revenue is than how much the
government takes if it can use what it takes to help the people who
most need help. The United States has on paper one of the most pro-
gressive tax systems in the industrialized world, and the greatest lev-
els of social and economic inequality. . . . American progressives to-
day prefer to genuflect to progressive pieties than to achieve progres-
sive results.219
A results-based focus would be welcome since it would acknowledge
that, given the history of the United States and the way formal equality
has worked in practice, results matter.
Looking at the estate tax from the perspective of the least wealthy
reveals that it is in many ways a symbolic levy. This symbolism has
some benefits, but it does little to change economic realities. The effec-
tive estate tax rate is currently less than 20%220 and only 0.14% of estates
are taxed.22 ' Meanwhile, the income tax system has provided substantial
benefits to those at the top of the wealth distribution. When the two taxes
are taken together, it follows that the American tax system has at best
reinforced wealth disparities and at worst exacerbated them. If redistribu-
tion is one of the goals of the tax system, an intuitive sense that progres-
sive rates and the estate tax will result in distributive justice does not
suffice. Instead, a more inclusive asset-building tax policy is necessary.
III. TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE SYSTEM OF WEALTH BUILDING
THROUGH THE TAx SYSTEM
This Part presents two proposals that would allow the nonwealthy to
benefit from current tax expenditures that disproportionately aid the
wealthy. The first is a revamped estate tax charitable deduction, which
would privilege bequests for wealth-building activities. The second is a
refundable tax credit for asset-building accounts, which would provide
systematic asset account accumulation for the nonwealthy.
A. A Revamped Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
1. The Current Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
As previously discussed, the estate tax includes a deduction for be-
quests made to charity. The original estate statute enacted in 1916 did not
contain this deduction. It was added by the Revenue Act of 1918.222 The
current provision is section 2055,223 which is in some ways similar to the
more familiar section 170 income tax deduction provision, but differs in
219. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
PROGRESSIVISM 61 (1998).
220. See TAX POLICY CENTER, Gross and Net Estate Tax, supra note 124.
221. See TAX POLICY CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability, supra note 122.
222. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1 1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1068.
223. I.R.C. § 2055 (2012).
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others. The income tax charitable deduction is limited based on the do-
nor's income, the nature of the donee organization, and the asset donat-
ed.224 It is possible for a contribution to qualify for one deduction and not
the other.225 More importantly, the estate tax deduction is unlimited in
the sense that it is not subject to the percentage limitations applicable to
the income tax deduction.226 As such, no estate tax is due if the entirety
of the estate is left to qualifying charitable organizations.
Section 2055 assumes that charitable organizations perform services
that are beneficial to the nation and would otherwise have to be paid out
of tax revenues. Only organizations that are enumerated in section 2055
are eligible for the deduction. Thus, a bequest to a poor or indigent indi-
vidual will not qualify.227 Also, the deduction is not assured merely be-
cause a portion of the decedent's wealth reaches a qualified organization.
It must get there by way of bequest, legacy devise, or transfer dece-
dent.228 The five general classes of recipients to which deductible be-
quests can be made are: (1) the U.S. government, the states, and political
subdivisions;229 (2) corporations "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes";2 30 (3)
trusts and certain fraternal organizations as long as the money is used
exclusively for charitable and related purposes;231 (4) veterans' organiza-
tions; 232 and (5) employee Stock Ownership Plans under certain limited
circumstances.233
Some wealthy decedents prefer to leave their wealth to fund private
foundations. In the most basic terms, a private foundation is a charitable
organization that is funded primarily by a single donor or a small number
of major donors.234 While the income tax deduction for private donations
to private foundations is limited to 30% of adjusted gross income, it is
224. See id § 170(b).
225. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 681 F.2d 534, 539-40 (8th Cir.
1982) (holding that a bequest to a cemetery association is not deductible for purposes of § 2055
despite being eligible for a § 170 deduction).
226. Compare I.R.C. § 2055 with id. § 170(b). Pursuant to § 170, contributions to charitable
organizations may be deducted up to 50 percent of adjusted gross income. Contributions to certain
private foundations, veterans organizations, fraternal societies, and cemetery organizations are
limited to 30 percent adjusted gross income. Section 2055 does not contain such percentage limita-
tions.
227. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-30-008 (Apr. 22, 1996) (allowing a deductible bequest
to fund college scholarships for graduates of one high school), with I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-31-
004 (Apr. 30, 1996) (establishing a nondeductible bequest to provide scholarships for students with a
particular family name who attend one of two universities where only 603 families had such a
name).
228. For example, if the executor had discretion to give the property to a private person, no
charitable deduction is allowed even though the property passes to charity. Estate of Marine v.
Comm'r, 990 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1993).
229. I.R.C. § 2055(a)(1).
230. Id. § 2055(a)(2).
231. Id. § 2055(a)(3).
232. Id. § 2055(a)(4).
233. Id. § 2055(a)(5).




unlimited for estate tax purposes subject to some limitations. These
foundations allow wealthy donors to immortalize their names, while con-
tinuing to make donations to a variety of organizations for many years
after death.236 The Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and more recently, Gates
Foundations are all emblematic.
2. An Asset-Building Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
Several policy rationales have been offered for the charitable deduc-
237tion. For example, Miranda Perry Fleischer's exploration of the nor-
mative bases for the estate tax charitable deduction found that "while the
case for . .. [the] deduction is strong, the case for an unlimited deduction
is weak."238 According to Fleischer, "bequests to family-controlled chari-
ties allow a decedent to pass on economic or political power" because
the family can make decisions about which grants to award.239 A perfect
example of this was the power wielded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as the
president and later chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation.240 For this
reason, Fleischer argues that deductibility rules should depend on the
type of recipient organization because the proper treatment of a bequest
should depend on whether it benefits the wealthy or nonwealthy.24 1
One does not have to accept Fleischer's argument to reach the con-
clusion that the estate tax charitable deduction should be limited. Even if
the deduction is just instrumental, it should only be allowed to the extent
that it furthers federal government policy. Because the state tax is ex-
plicitly focused on wealth and providing equality of opportunity, I argue
that the charitable deduction should be more sensitive to the destination
of bequests. I propose that the current deduction be capped at 50%. This
would still allow a variety of charities to benefit from private funds. The
235. Id. § 4942(a); see id §§ 4940-4946 (taxing private foundations additionally if they do not
distribute income, have excessive business holdings, make investments that jeopardize their purpose,
etc.).
236. Donald Fisher, The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Produc-
tion of Hegemony: Rockefeller Foundations and the Social Sciences, 17 SOCIOLOGY 206, 223-24
(1983). For example, the Ford Foundation was established in 1936. In 2011 it reported a $10 billion
endowment and approved $413 million in grants. FORD FOUND., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 AND 2010, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/about/FFFYFinancialStatements_2011 .pdf.
237. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 360-62 (1972) (offering a base-defining rationale); Boris 1. Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60 (1972) ("[S]omething can be
said for rewarding activities which in a certain sense are selfless, even if the reward serves no incen-
tive function."); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393, 1394 (1988) (offering a social goods rationale); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 387, 411 (1998) (arguing that the deduction's "ongoing" nature also enhances decision
making).
238. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 268-69.
239. Id at 285-86.
240. Chelsea Clinton is now the Vice Chair of the Clinton Foundation and will likely carry on
her parents' work upon their death. About, Chelsea Clinton, CLINTON FOUND.,
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/about/chelsea-clinton (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
241. Fleischer, supra note 129, at 297.
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estate tax deduction should only be unlimited or uncapped if the bequest
is targeted to help the nonwealthy build wealth.
As I have argued above, asset building for the poor is central to the
enterprise of lessening wealth disparities. The charitable deduction is a
good place for the federal government to incorporate asset building into
the estate tax. The unlimited deduction represents potential asset-
building funds that the government foregoes. While it may be desirable
for the government to encourage giving to a variety of organizations,
because of the importance of assets, it should tie the benefit of the deduc-
tion to the furtherance of wealth building.
Because deductions are privileges, the burden would be on the es-
tate to show that the bequest indeed furthers wealth-building activities.
This is by no means far-fetched, since many organizations already sup-
port wealth-building efforts.2 42 The charity would not have to solely sup-
port wealth building. Rather, the bequest could be worded to earmark the
money for those purposes.
Of course, there would be definitional and administrative problems,
but I do not believe that these are any worse than those that already exist.
The federal government could determine which activities promote wealth
from a varied menu of policies already in place. This could be done by
using a multi-factor test. For example, the bequest would qualify if it
supported activities that furthered either: (1) the purchase of a home; (2)
the payment of healthcare expenses; (3) the payment of educational ex-
penses; or (4) retirement savings for those below an income threshold of
$50,000. This is by no means an exclusive list, but it represents a good
start. In addition taxpayers would also be able to apply for private letter
rulings. As such, risk-averse taxpayers could ensure that their bequest
would qualify for the unlimited deduction.
There is also the possibility that this could lead to the difficult and
perhaps undesirable task of ranking charities. I do not believe that this
should defeat the proposal, however. I am only proposing one distinc-
tion: bequests that further wealth building among the nonwealthy and
bequests that do not. I think this is justifiable because the estate tax is
focused on wealth redistribution and equality of opportunity.243 This
would bring the tax closer to redistributing in a meaningful way.
Finally, as previously noted the income tax deduction is already
limited in several ways.244 As such, it would not be unprecedented to
make this change. Much of the early research and development of asset-
242. For example, by 2001, "[e]leven private foundations were funding research on individual
development accounts at thirteen community programs around the country." Sherraden, supra note
10, at 312.
243. See supra Part IL A. I.
244. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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building accounts for the poor has been funded by private foundations.245
Limiting the estate tax deduction in some ways should serve to further
nudge individual bequests in this socially desirable way.
B. Income Tax Credits for the Nonwealthy
The federal income tax currently includes a limited credit for the
low-income taxpayers who contribute to their retirement savings. This
section explains the details of this credit and argues for a more robust
asset-building credit.
1. The Current Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit
The Code includes a tax credit for low-income individuals who save
246for retirement. Also known as the Saver's Credit, this federal tax pro-
vision provides a credit of 10 to 50% of savings, depending on overall
247income and filing status. The credit is limited by a taxpayer's adjusted
gross income, adjusted for inflation.24 8 The income limits for 2013 are:
(1) $28,750 for a single taxpayer; (2) $43,125 for a head of household;
and (3) $57,500 for married taxpayers filing jointly. 249 The maximum
credit is $2,000 for unmarried filers and $4,000 for married filers.250
Although this credit does promote asset building by the nonwealthy,
it suffers from three obvious limitations. First, it only applies to retire-
ment contributions. While these are important, they are just one aspect of
asset building. The poor often cannot save for retirement because they
have to prioritize other, more immediate, savings needs.251 Thus, it is
unfortunate that if the nonwealthy taxpayer would like to save for a
home, a business, or an education, the credit does not apply. Second, the
credit is nonrefundable.2 52 As such, any individual with zero tax liability
receives no assistance because there is no liability to offset the credit.
This means that the poorest taxpayers, who are most in need of asset-
building assistance do not benefit. Finally, and related to the second limi-
tation, the credit includes no carryover provision. Thus, any unused por-
tion of the credit is lost.
245. Michael Sherraden, From Research to Policy: Lessons from Individual Development
Accounts, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 159, 164 (2000).
246. I.R.C. § 25B (2012).
247. Id The credit was made permanent by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-280, § 812, 120 Stat. 780.
248. I.R.C. § 25B.
249. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8880 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
prior/f8880--2012.pdf.
250. I.R.C. § 25B(a).
251. See Shobe & Page-Adams, supra note 46, at 119.
252. PUBLICATION 590-A CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS
(IRAS), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 48 (2015).
2014] 175
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. A Refundable Credit for Asset Building
Because of the disparity between tax expenditures for the wealthy
and nonwealthy, I propose expanding the coverage of the current Saver's
Credit. The credit would be refundable and would reward contributions
to any kind of asset-building account.253 Because the tax system's pro-
gressivity prevents low-income participants from benefiting from the
panoply of tax-favored accounts, these credits should continue to be
means tested. As is the case with the current Saver's Credit, the taxpayer
would have to file a tax return to show she qualifies. Unlike the current
nonrefundable Saver's Credit, however, the IRS would deposit the re-
fundable funds directly into a designated asset-building account. Because
the Saver's Credit infrastructure is already in place, this new credit
should not be as difficult to get off the ground.
Some would object that this proposal would be too costly, but it
would bring some much-needed equity to the tax system. As I have pre-
viously shown, the federal government expends substantial resources on
asset-building accounts for those with higher incomes.2 54 My proposal
only asks for government expenditures for those with low incomes. Of
course, the new credit would suffer from the same potential for error and
abuse that could plague other refundable credits, such as the EITC.255
This is no different than several other popular government programs like
Medicare and Medicaid.256 The most likely cause of the high error rate of
EITC payments is the complexity of the credit itself.2 57 This does not
make the EITC any less valuable to low-income citizens. Instead, it
points to some much-needed simplification of the rules.
Finally, there is also the potential that the credit for asset-building
accounts could become "raced" and be seen as another form of wel-
fare.258 While this is a danger, I am optimistic because of the wide, bipar-
tisan support that asset-building accounts have garnered. They have been
packaged as a more sustainable way of allowing individuals to improve
their economic position in the long term.
253. Edward Zelinsky has recommended that the credit be expanded to reward contributions to
HSAs, educational savings accounts and Section 529 programs. ZELINSKY, supra note 12, at 159-
61. 1 use the more general term "asset-building accounts" to include these as well as IDAs and
CDAs.
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. Lipman, supra note 11, at 465-67 (analyzing diminishing EITC benefits for the working
poor and showing the significant costs that tax practitioners exact for their services).
256. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROPER PAYMENTS: INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORTING OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE UNDER THE IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND
RECOVERY ACT 13 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667332.pdf
257. Id. at 8.




I began by discussing the importance of wealth in our society and
presenting the problem of wealth inequality and disparities. A close in-
spection of the estate tax, the primary federal policy addressing wealth,
revealed that the estate tax has only reduced wealth concentration mini-
mally. Further, although research has revealed that asset building is of
vital importance for the poor, I demonstrated that the income tax system
has largely targeted its asset-building efforts toward the wealthy. As
such, our tax system has served to reinforce existing wealth disparities
rather than help poorer people build wealth.
Next, I presented two ways in which the government could promote
asset building in a more inclusive way. I noted that currently the gov-
ernment spends substantial funds building assets for those with higher
incomes and greater wealth. The federal government has done much less
to help the poor and nonwealthy acquire assets. The nation's focus on
income support, consumption support, and work incentives can and has
helped families to manage in the short term, but it has done little to im-
prove long-term financial stability and reduce wealth inequality. By pro-
posing a revamped estate tax charitable deduction and tax credits for
asset-building accounts, I argue that we could engage the tax system in
remedying wealth disparities.
Of course, wealth inequality is a difficult problem, and tax policies
alone will not suffice. Income support policies are still needed, as well as
debt reduction policies, and more robust support for healthcare expenses.
However, a continuation of our schizophrenic wealth tax policy will only
undermine those efforts. Whether it is because of market inefficiencies,
plutocratic concerns,2 59 or the increased possibility for social unrest, de-
creasing wealth disparities remains an important policy goal.
259. See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
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